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GROUP BIAS-AN IMPROPER GROUND FOR THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IN CALIFORNIA
I. INTRODUCTION
Gertrude Stein will always be remembered for her classic statement
that "a rose is a rose is a rose."' The California Supreme Court may be
remembered for its contrary conclusion in People v. Jpheeler2 that a
peremptory challenge is not a peremptory challenge when utilized to
remove prospective jurors because of group bias.' This conclusion is
contrary to the rule of the United States Supreme Court in Swain v.
Alabama4 and to the rule in the majority of states.5
The right to a trial by an impartial jury in criminal cases has long
been recognized by both federal6 and California law.7 An essential
prerequisite to an impartial jury, as delineated by the United States
Supreme Court nearly forty years ago in Smith v. Texas,8 is that it be
1. G. STEIN, Sacred Emily, in GEOGRAPHY AND PLAYS 178, 187 (1922).
2. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
3. Id at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
4. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
5. See Id at 228 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI reads, in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ......
7. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 reads, in pertinent part: 'Trial by jury is an inviolate right and
shall be secured to all ...."
The notion of impartiality is rooted in the common law, "which demanded the strictest
impartiality upon the part of each individual juror, [and] which declared that, one and all,
should, as between the crown and the defendant, 'stand indifferent as they stand unsworn'."
People v. Helm, 152 Cal. 532, 535, 93 P. 99, 101 (1907), disapproved on other grounds, People
v. Edwards, 163 Cal. 752, 756, 127 P. 58, 59 (1912). This common law requirement of an
impartial jury was incorporated in California's jury trial provision.
The right of trial by jury is fundamental. It is a right which was transmitted to us by the
common law and as such is expressly guaranteed by the constitution, and the distinctive
quality of that right-its very essence-is that every person put upon trial upon an issue
involving his life or his liberty is entitled to have such issue tried by a jury consisting of
unbiased and unprejudiced persons.
People v. Bennett, 79 Cal. App. 76, 91, 249 P. 20, 26 (1926). See also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1078 (West 1970), wherein the state legislature provided that "[it shall be the duty of the
trial court to examine the prospective jurors to select a fair and impartialjury." (emphasis
added).
8. 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (state conviction of black defendant reversed on equal protection
grounds after a showing that blacks had been excluded systematically from grand jury serv-
ice). Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Black said:
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice
that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. For racial discrimination
to result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only vio-
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drawn from a representative cross section of the community.' The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court explained the rationale for this rule in Wheeler:
[In our heterogeneous society jurors will inevitably belong to diverse and
often overlapping groups defined by race, religion, ethnic or national ori-
gin, sex, age, education, occupation, economic condition, place of resi-
dence, and political affiliation; . . . it is unrealistic to expect jurors to be
devoid of opinions, preconceptions or even deep-rooted biases derived
from their life experiences in such groups; and hence. . . the only practi-
cal way to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the representa-
tion of a variety of such groups on the jury so that the respective biases of
their members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to cancel each
other out.' 0
California accepted the representative cross section rule many years
before it was required to do so by federal constitutional interpreta-
tion. " However, it was not until the decision in Wfheeler that the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court expressly held that article I, section 16 of the
California Constitution guaranteed the right to trial by a jury drawn
from a representative cross section of the community.'
2
lates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic con-
cepts of democratic society and a representative government.
Id at 130 (footnote omitted).
Smith was followed by a series of cases wherein members of an identifiable group were
excluded from jury service. In each, the Supreme Court affirmed the representative jury
requirement. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (defendants' contention
that nonmembers of League of Women Voters had been excluded from petit juries rejected
by the Court due to insufficient proof; however, strong reaffirmation of requirement of a
representative jury); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (exclusion of daily wage
earners from petit jury service ground for reversal); Ballard v. United States 329 U.S. 187
(1946) (plurality opinion) (conviction reversed due to deliberate exclusion of women from
service on grand and petit juries); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (state conviction of
white defendant overturned upon showing that blacks had been excluded from both grand
and petit jury service); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (reversal of conviction
of male defendant on ground that women had been excluded from jury service) ("Restrict-
ing jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles
in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept ofjury trial."). See also
Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1976) in which Congress stated: "It
is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury
shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from afair cross section of
the community. . . ." Id § 1861 (emphasis added).
9. See note 8 supra. See generally J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 45-83
(1977) [hereinafter cited as VAN DYKE].
10. 22 Cal. 3d at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
11. The representative cross section rule was not applied to the states as an integral com-
ponent of the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury incorporated in the fourteenth
amendment until Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The Supreme Court in Taylor
held "that the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community
is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." 419 U.S. at 528.
12. 22 Cal. 3d at 272, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. "[W]e. .. hold that in
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The guarantee of a representative jury can be threatened at any one
of the three stages in the jury selection process: the compilation of the
roster of eligible jurors,1 3 the excusing of prospective jurors by the
court,' 4 or the exercise of challenges against veniremen.1 5
this state the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the commu-
nity is guaranteed equally and independently by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Con-
stitution and by article I, section 16, of the California Consitution." Id See, e.g., People v.
White, 43 Cal. 2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1954) (California high court condemned jury selection
system that tended to produce venires which were not representative cross sections of the
community). In reiterating the necessity of having a representative cross section rule as a
requirement for an impartial jury, the court said:
The American system requires an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the en-
tire community and recognition must be given to the fact that eligible jurors are to be
found in every stratum of society. . . .Any system or method of jury selection which
fails to adhere to these democratic fundamentals, which is not designed to encompass a
cross-section of the community or which seeks to favor limited social or economic
classes, is not in keeping with the American tradition and will not be condoned by this
court.
Id at 754, 278 P.2d at 18. The lack of specificity in White as to whether the court was
interpreting the California or Federal Constitution regarding the cross section rule led, in
part, to the California Supreme Court's ruling in Wheeler. 22 Cal. 3d at 272, 583 P.2d at
758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
13. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 204(e) (West Supp. 1979). See also id §§ 203-220. For fed-
eral cases dealing with the compilation of the master list from which venires are drawn, see
cases cited at note 8 supra. For some California cases, see People v. Spears, 48 Cal. App. 3d
397, 122 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1975) (petit jury venire); People v. Pinell, 43 Cal. App. 3d 627, 117
Cal. Rptr. 913 (1974) (grand jury venire); People v. Powell, 40 Cal. App. 3d 107, 124-33, 115
Cal. Rptr. 109, 119-25 (1974) (petit jury venire); Adams v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 3d
719, 104 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1972) (petit jury venire); People v. Goodspeed, 22 Cal. App. 3d 690,
699-705, 99 Cal. Rptr. 696, 702-06 (1972) (grand jury venire); In re Wells, 20 Cal. App. 3d
640, 649-50, 98 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5-6 (1971) (grand jury venire); People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d
359, 388-91, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 413-15 (1970) (grand and petit jury venires). See generally
VAN DYKE, supra note 9, at 85-109.
14. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 198-199 (West Supp. 1979) (juror disqualification due to
incompetency); id § 200 (juror excused on ground of undue hardship). Section 200 replaced
former CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 200 (West 1954). This 1975 change helps to diminish the
possibility of abuse of automatic exemptions. However, the power of the court to excuse
prospective jurors on the ambiguous grounds of suitability and undue hardship permits a
large degree of discretion and, consequently, abuse. See VAN DYKE, supra note 9, at 111-37.
15. A challenge to an individual juror is either peremptory or for cause. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1067 (West 1970).
A challenge for cause is either "general" or "particular." Id § 1071. A general challenge
deals with a juror's competency to serve in any case; a particular challenge concerns actual
or implied bias in the matter on trial. Id §§ 1071-1073. Actual bias is "the existence of a
state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to either of the parties,
which will prevent him from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of either party." Id § 1073. Implied bias, on the other hand, exists when a
juror is in one of several enumerated relationships with a party: consanguinity, trust, em-
ployment, or involved in a previous legal proceeding concerning the parties or the instant
case. Id § 1074.
The second type of challenge, a peremptory challenge, is "an objection to a juror for
which no reason need be given, but upon which the Court must exclude him." Id § 1069.
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This comment will focus on one aspect of the third stage-the use of
the peremptory challenge 6 to exclude members of the venire solely on
the basis of "group bias.'"'7
II. BACKGROUND
The peremptory challenge has its roots in the Middle Ages'I and was
recognized in the United States as early as 1790.9 Although the
Supreme Court has expressed the view that the peremptory challenge is
"essential to the fairness of a trial by jury,"20 and thus "one of the most
important rights secured by the accused,"'" the Constitution does not
require that Congress grant peremptory challenges. During its history,
the Supreme Court has articulated inconsistent views concerning the
use of the peremptory challenge. In one case, the Court advised that it
could utilize its supervisory powers to guard against unreasonable use
The peremptory challenge permits the prosecution or defense counsel to utilize judgement
regarding matters which he senses might be prejudicial to his case, but which do not meet
the requirements of a challenge for cause.
The procedure commonly used in the federal courts for exercising peremptory challenges
is known as the "struck jury." By this method,
[t]he size of the panel [when the striking procedure commences] . . . is the sum of the
number of jurors to hear the case plus the number of peremptories to be allowed all
parties. The parties then proceed to exercise their peremptories, usually alternately or
in some similar way which will result in all parties exhausting their challenges at ap-
proximately the same time.
A.B.A. STANDARDS, TRIAL BY JURY 77-78 (1968).
In California, challenges are allowed either as the individual jurors are questioned, or
after the jury box is filled with twelve prospective jurors. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1088 (West
1970). For the number of peremptory challenges permitted, see id § 1070(b) (West Supp.
1979) (offenses punishable by imprisonment for 90 days or less); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1070(a) (as amended by ch. 98 sec. 2) (1978 Cal. Legis. Serv.) (offenses punishable by
death, lite imprisonment, and those offenses not included under § 1070(b)); id § 1070.5
(multiple defendants). See generally VAN DYKE, supra note 9, at 139-75.
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069 (West 1970). See note 15 supra.
17. For purposes of this comment, "group bias" will be used to mean any cognizable
characteristic of a group of persons, including, but not limited to, race, sex, religion, age,
economic position, and political affiliation.
18. T. PLUNKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 433 (5th ed. 1956).
19. In 1790, Congress codified the right of a criminal defendant to exercise peremptory
challenges. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 119. The prosecution's right of peremp-
tory challenge was recognized in the Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 2, 13 Stat. 500. See gener-
ally 28 U.S.C. § 1867 (1976). For criminal cases, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 24. For a more
detailed account of the development of the peremptory challenge, see Orfield, Trial Jurors in
Federal Criminal Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43, 92-107 (1962). See generally Note, Peremptory Chal-
lenge--Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. L.J. 157,
158-59 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Peremptory Challenge].
20. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
21. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
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of the peremptory challenge;22 in a later decision, the Court noted that
it could not control a party's use of this challenge.23
III. SUPREME COURT VIEW: SWAIN V AL.4B4MA4
The most recent position taken by the Supreme Court was an-
nounced in Swain v. Alabama.24 That case held that the peremptory
striking of black prospective jurors did not constitute a denial of due
process." The petitioner established that the prosecutor had used his
peremptory challenges to exclude all six blacks on the jury panel.26 Pe-
titioner further established that no black person, in a period of more
than fifteen years, had served on either a criminal or civil petit jury in
Talladega County, Alabama. This occurred even though over twenty-
five percent of the qualified jurors in the county were black, and be-
tween ten and fifteen percent of all veniremen were black.27 The Court
rejected the petitioner's claim that the prosecution's actions violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, because "[t]o
subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands
and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a
radical change in the nature and operation of the challenge."2 The
Court stated that the peremptory challenge is often used "on grounds
normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action,
namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of peo-
ple summoned for jury duty.
'" 29
In response to the petitioner's showing that no black had ever served
on a civil or criminal petit jury, the Supreme Court acknowledged:
22. Sawyer v. United States, 202 U.S. 150, 165 (1906) ("The exercise of this right [of
peremptory challenge] is under the supervision of the court.").
23. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) ("The essential nature of the peremptory
challenge is that it is one exercised . . without being subject to the court's control.").
24. Id. at 220.
25. The petitioner in Swain asserted three separate claims, none of which was accepted by
the Court. First, he claimed discrimination in the selection of the venire. Id at 205-09.
Second, he claimed that the selection of the venire was prejudicial because of the prosecu-
tor's use of peremptory challenges against eligible black veniremen. .Id at 209-22. And
third, the petitioner alleged that the fact that no blacks had served on a jury for a period of
15 years was evidence of discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge. Id at 222-24.
26. Id at 210 & n.6.
27. Id at 205.
28. Id at 221-22. Because the peremptory challenge "is often exercised upon the 'sudden
impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and
gestures of another'," the Court believed that to subject a challenge of this type to examina-
tion would destroy its essence. Id at 220, 222 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370,
376 (1892)).
29. d at 220.
1979]
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[W]hen a prosecutor in a county, in case after case, .. is responsible for
the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the
jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the
result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment claim takes on added significance.3 °
Justice Goldberg in dissent3' was highly critical of the majority's posi-
tion in Swain, as were many commentators. 32 Justice Goldberg be-
lieved that a showing that no black had ever served on a petit jury
presented a prima facie case of deliberate discrimination sufficient to
require rebuttal by the state.33 He further urged acceptance of the prin-
ciple expressed many years previously that "a State cannot systemati-
cally exclude persons from juries solely because of their race or
color."
'34
Justice Goldberg sharply criticized the Court's imposition of a severe
burden of proof in Swain. Instead of the majority's requirement of to-
tal state-produced exclusion of blacks, 35 he urged that the test should
30. Id at 223 (emphasis added). Accompanying the Court's acknowledgement is "[t]hc
presumption in any particular case ... that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to
obtain a fair and impartial jury." Id at 222. This presumption is very difficult to rebut and
has been sharply criticized by at least one legal scholar. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The
Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 286-87 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kuhn]. Kuhn com-
ments:
The Supreme Court's view seems to suppose that when a prosecutor trying a Negro
removes Negro veniremen to get white ones, his objective is to remove possible
prejudice in order to substitute probable impartiality, and that the natural effect of re-
moving all Negroes by peremptory challenge is to produce a fair, albeit white, jury. To
state the point is sufficient to refute it.
Id Many defendants since Swain have objected to the use of peremptory challenges to ex-
clude groups, thereby resulting in the selection of an all white jury. However, the Court's
systematic exclusion rule, ie., the requirement that one show the removal of a particular
group of jurors in case after case, has proven to be an insurmountable obstacle for most
petitioners. See Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 14 (1977). The primary reasons that the Swain system-
atic exclusion test is so difficult to satisfy are: (I) a mere absence of blacks or other groups
from juries does not establish systematic exclusion, 380 U.S. at 205-09; (2) the prosecution is
presumed to be using the peremptory challenges to obtain a fair jury in any given case, id at
222; and (3) the Court never fully explained the elements of systematic exclusion other than
to note that it might exist when "no Negroes ever sit on petit juries" as a result of the prose-
cutor's exercise of his peremptory challenges, id at 223.
31. 380 U.S. at 228-47 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (Justice Goldberg's dissent was joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas).
32. See, e.g., Martin, The Ffth Circuit andJury Selection Cases.- The Negro Defendant and
His Peerless Jury, 4 Hous. L. REV. 448 (1966); The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 103, 135-39 (1965); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the
Perpetuation ofthe All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Constitu-
tional Blueprint]; Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J. 322 (1965).
33. 380 U.S. at 238 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
34. Id at 228 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880)).
35. In Swain, the Court found the petitioner's collected data to be insufficient because it
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be whether the state participated in exclusion to some significant de-
gree.36 To require that a defendant present evidence of the conduct
and motives of a prosecutor in earlier trials extending over an indeter-
minable period of time is to ask that the defendant do that which he
most likely cannot.3 7
Lower courts attempting to apply Swain have offered interesting sug-
gestions as to how a defendant might satisfy his burden of proof on the
issue of systematic exclusion of a particular group. One court,38 in dic-
tum, suggested that a defendant might be able to meet the burden of
proof even if he failed to show that the peremptory challenge was used
to exclude group members 100% of the time.39 A system whereby the
defendant could check the court docket for the names of defendants
and their attorneys, determine the race of the various defendants, and
learn the final composition of the trial jury and manner in which each
side exercised its peremptory challenges might aid the defendant in
meeting his burden.40
Thus far, the most effective method available to defendants attempt-
ing to prove discrimination in federal court is the statistical decision
theory. This method permits one to calculate the mathematical
probability that a discrepancy between the number of eligible jurors of
a particular group and their representation at each step of the jury se-
lection process is caused by chance.41 The Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged the efficacy of statistical decision theory in the context of
exclusion of blacks from both grand and petit juries during the early
did. not show, "with any acceptable degree of clarity,. . . when, how often, and under what
circumstances the prosecutor alone ha[d] been responsible for striking those Negroes who
have appeared on petit jury panels." 380 U.S. at 224 (emphasis added). "IT]he defendant
must ... show the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges against Negroes
over a period of time." Id at 227 (emphasis added). Some legal scholars speculate:
The reason for the need to have an overwhelming statistical case, or other proof of
purposeful discrimination in this [peremptory] challenge may relate to the Court's be-
lief that the practice of peremptory challenge helps to insure truly fair trials and this
practice therefore ought not to be overturned by a judicial decision without clear and
convincing proof.
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 530 (1978).
36. 380 U.S. at 235 n.2 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
37. "[T]he new burden of proof with which the Swain opinion saddles the defendant,
although only sketchily articulated, seems an impossible one for any single individual to
carry." Constitutional Blueprint, supra note 32, at 1160. See also authorities cited at note 30
supra.
38. United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1971).
39. Id at 1217 (dictum).
40. Id at 1218 n.26 (dictum).
41. See Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to Jury Discrimination
Cases, 80 HARV. L. Rav. 338 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Finkelstein]; THE JURY SYSTEM:
NEW METHODS FOR REDUCING PREJUDICE 14-16 (D. Kairys ed. 1975).
1979]
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stages of the jury selection process, 42 and a number of lower courts
43
have followed its lead. To date, no court has applied this test to a claim
of systematic exclusion caused by the use of the peremptory chal-
lenge.44
IV. CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION:
PEOPLE V WHEELER
A. Factual Basis
The problem of the exclusion of blacks from a jury through the use
of the peremptory challenge arose recently in California in Wheeler.
The defendant, a black man, was convicted of first degree murder.
During voir dire, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges against
each of the seven black prospective jurors among the venire. The pros-
ecutor asked no questions of some of the black jurors before exercising
a peremptory challenge against them.45 After the prosecution's deci-
sion to challenge peremptorily the fifth black prospective juror, the de-
fense attorney moved for a mistrial "so we can try and get a fair cross
section of the community.I46 The trial court denied the motion.47 Af-
ter the two remaining blacks on the panel were excused from the jury, a
second motion for mistrial was made on the grounds that
there are seven Negroes that have been kicked off the jury by [the prose-
cutor] . . . . It is apparent that it is a policy of the district attorney's
office not to permit any Negroes on this jury. Some of them have been
kicked [off] without . . . [the prosecutor's] even questioning them....
[T]hese defendants cannot get a trial by their peers.
48
Again, the motion for a mistrial was denied by the trial judge, who
ruled that "attorneys have a right to select the jury and use all the per-
emptions available to them without stating their reasons. '49 As a result
of the challenges by the prosecutor, all twelve members of the jury and
the two alternate jurors were white.5 0
42. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967). For a discussion of the stages of the jury
selection process, see notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Gibson v. Blair, 467 F.2d 842, 844 n.l (5th Cir. 1972); Smith v. Yeager, 465
F.2d 272, 278 n.16 (3d Cir. 1972); Witcher v. Peyton, 405 F.2d 725, 726 n.3 (4th Cir. 1969);
Goins v. Allgood, 391 F.2d 692, 699 n.6 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
44. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 279, 583 P.2d at 763, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
45. Id at 265, 583 P.2d at 753, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
46. Id at 264, 583 P.2d at 753, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
47. Id





B. The Court's Reasoning
In Wheeler, the California Supreme Court considered for the first
time5 whether a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges which ex-
clude prospective jurors on the sole ground of group association is vio-
lative of the representative cross section rule. In order to resolve the
important problem posed by Wheeler, the court first examined the fun-
damental right of a defendant to be tried by a jury representative of the
community.52 By explicitly making the cross section rule a guarantee
of the California Constitution,53 the court set the stage for a decision
which insulates defendants in California state proceedings from the
heavy burden of proving systematic exclusion as required by Swain.54
In determining the appropriate uses of the peremptory challenge, the
court examined the relationship between the challenge stage and other
periods in the jury selection process. The court aptly noted:
Until this point in the process [ie., the challenge stage] the goal of an
impartial jury is pursued by insuring that the master list be a representa-
tive cross-section of the community and that the venire and the proposed
trial jury be drawn therefrom by wholly random means. But precisely
because it is both all-inclusive and random, the process cannot consist-
ently screen out those prospective jurors who bring to the courtroom a
bias concerning the particular case on trial or the parties or witnesses
thereto. 5
By reviewing the purposes of the challenges, the court ascertained
that their scope was "to remove jurors who are believed to entertain a
51. Id at 263, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893. Writing for the dissent, Justice
Richardson disagreed with the majority's assertion that the issue in Wheeler was one of first
impression. Id at 290, 583 P.2d at 770, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 912 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
He claimed that the case of People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 464 P.2d 64, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608
(1970), concerned the constitutionality of the prosecution's use of the peremptory challenge,
thereby rendering the majority's claim of first impression inaccurate. In Floyd, however, a
death penalty case, the evidence failed to establish that any juror had been peremptorily
challenged solely because of his scruples against the death penalty. Id. at 728, 464 P.2d at
86, 83 Cal. Rptr at 630. Thus, the Wheeler case is distinguishable.
52. 22 Cal. 3d at 266-72, 583 P.2d at 754-58, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896-99. See notes 8, 11, 12
supra and accompanying text.
53. 22 Cal. 3d at 272, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. See note 12 supra and
accompanying text.
54. See note 30 supra.
55. 22 Cal. 3d at 274, 583 P.2d at 759-60, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901. Specific bias is not to be
used interchangeably with actual bias. Specific bias is a term encompassing the range of
feelings, from those derived from personal experiences to those resulting from general expo-
sure to pretrial publicity. Id, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901. Actual bias, on the
other hand, is "the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the
case, or to either of the parties, which will prevent him from acting with entire impartiality
and without prejudice." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1073 (West 1970).
1979]
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specific bias, and no others." 56 The court also clarified the language of
California Penal Code section 1069,17 interpreting it to mean that, al-
though a reason need not be publicly stated when a peremptory chal-
lenge is used, some justification for the use of this challenge must
nonetheless exist.5 To support its view, the majority indicated that,
with only a limited number of peremptory challenges allowed, "a party
will use a peremptory challenge only when he believes that the juror he
removes may be consciously or unconsciously biased against him, or
that his successor may be less biased."'5 9
Cognizant of the broad spectrum of evidence giving rise to an infer-
ence of juror partiality, the California Supreme Court attempted to il-
lustrate those types of bias upon which a peremptory challenge may
properly be based.60 Prior arrests, complaints of police harassment, or
clothing and grooming styles may create in the prosecutor a feeling that
a juror is biased against his side. Similarly, defense counsel may fear
prejudice in a juror who has been, or knows someone who has been, the
victim of a crime or who has relatives on the police force. The Califor-
nia high court acknowledged that evidence even less tangible than that
mentioned could result in the use of a peremptory challenge,6' such as,




All of these reasons, nevertheless, share a common element: they seek
to eliminate a specific bias. . .- a bias relating to the particular case on
trial or the parties or witnesses thereto .... [T]hey are essentially neu-
tral with respect to the various groups represented on the venire: the
characteristics on which they focus cut across many segments of our soci-
ety. . . . It follows that peremptory challenges predicated on such rea-
sons do not significantly skew the population mix of the venire in one
direction or another; rather, they promote the impartiality of the jury
without destroying its representativeness.
By contrast, when a party presumes that certain jurors are biased
merely because they are members of an identifiable group distinguished
56. 22 Cal. 3d at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
57. By statute, the definition of a peremptory challenge is "an objection to a juror for
which no reason need be given, but upon which the Court must exclude him." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1069 (West 1970).
58. 22 Cal. 3d at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
59. Id at 275, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
60. Id, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
61. Id.




on racial, religious, ethnic or similar grounds-. . . [known as] "group
bias"-and peremptorily strikes all such persons for that reason alone, he
not only upsets the demographic balance of the venire but frustrates the
primary purpose of the representative cross section requirement.63
It is when the peremptory challenge is used to exclude prospective
jurors on the sole ground of group bias that the cross section rule is not
met.6' This holding parts company with the position articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Swain. Unlike Swain, which requires
a showing of systematic exclusion of group members over a period of
time, Wheeler provides a remedy to the first defendant who falls victim
to discrimination caused by the use of the peremptory challenge. Ow-
ing to the modification of the burden of proof in California, defendants
have been relieved of the requirement of tracing the use of the peremp-
tory challenge in previous trials, hoping to find a pattern of abuse that
would substantiate their claims of discrimination.65 Not only is this
abandoned method prohibitive in terms of cost and time for most de-
fendants,66 but the data necessary to prove past abuse of the peremp-
tory challenge is unavailable.67
C. The Test
The Wheeler court began with a presumption that a party exercising
63. 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. The representative cross
section requirement was set forth in Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940). See also note 8
supra.
64. 22 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. The holding in
Wheeler does not change the rule that no litigant is entitled to specific, proportional repre-
sentation on his particular jury. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59 (1961); People v.
White, 43 Cal. 2d 740, 749, 278 P.2d 9, 15 (1954); People v. Hines, 12 Cal. 2d 535, 539, 86
P.2d 92, 93-94 (1939).
65. 22 Cal. 3d at 287, 583 P.2d at 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
66. A defendant attempting to trace the use of the peremptory challenge in earlier cases
must explore the records of an indeterminable number of previous trials and would, conse-
quently, incur large discovery expenses. Defendants of limited means (most of the popula-
tion) could not afford to pay investigators to accumulate the necessary information. Id at
285, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909. Furthermore, even if such information could be
gathered in a cost efficient manner, "few if any trial judges would be willing to interrupt the
proceedings ... by a continuance of unpredictable length to permit the necessary investiga-
tion." Id at 286, 583 P.2d at 767-68, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 909. The reluctance of judges to halt
the proceedings stems from the fact that the appearance of abuse of a peremptory challenge
is not evident until the jury selection process is well under way. Id
67. The biggest obstacle to defendants trying to prove abuse of the peremptory challenge
over time is the absence of evidence listing the names and races of all prospective jurors, not
to mention those peremptorily challenged. See People v. Jones, 25 Cal. App. 3d 776, 782
n.5, 102 Cal. Rptr. 277, 281 n.5 (1972) (acknowledgement of difficulty encountered in prov-
ing case of discrimination from composition of venire because officials "do not keep records
based on race").
19791
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
a peremptory challenge in a criminal action is doing so on a constitu-
tionally permissible ground.68 The presumption, however, may be re-
butted if a three-pronged test is satisfied. First, the complaining party
must present a complete record of the circumstances surrounding the
removal of jurors from the venire.69 This step is necessary in order to
preserve the evidence regarding the use of peremptories for judicial re-
view. Second, the petitioner must show that those persons excused are
members of a cognizable group.7" And third, the party must show a
"strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of
their group association rather than because of any specific bias."'"
The above test was adopted rather than the statistical decision theory
urged by the defendant;72 the dissent considered it to be "so vague as to
constitute no standard at all."73 It is, however, the inexact nature of the
"strong likelihood" test that gives the court the discretion needed to
find abuse of the peremptory challenge. Such flexibility is not present
with statistical methods. Similarly, the test permits the court to find a
lack of abuse of the peremptory challenge even when it is confronted
with statistical data pointing to its misuse.
When the court finds that the three-pronged test has been met and,
consequently, that a prima facie case of group discrimination by the
peremptory challenge has been made, then the burden of proof shifts to
the other party to demonstrate that the peremptory challenges were
68. 22 Cal. 3d at 278, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904. This is the same presumption
as exists in Swain. See note 30 supra.
69. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. In Wheeler, the defense
preserved the prosecution's use of the peremptory challenges for the record by asking black
prospective jurors for an acknowledgement of his or her race. Id. at 263, 583 P.2d at 752,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 894. To one prospective juror, defense counsel remarked on voir dire:
"My client is black, obviously you are black, too." The juror replied: "Yes, I am." Id at
263 n.l, 583 P.2d at 753 n.1, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 894 n.l.
70. Id at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. See note 17 supra.
71. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. Demonstration that the
excluded jurors possess only one common characteristic-group membership-would tend
to support a showing that peremptory challenges were used for the reason of group associa-
tion. In addition, failure to ask questions of these jurors, or to ask only a few questions on
voir dire, would strengthen a claim of improper use of peremptory challenge.
72. Although the defendants originally selected a different mathematical method to com-
pute the probability that blacks were randomly excused, they adopted the statistical method
when an amicus curiae revealed that it produced results more favorable than those obtained
by the defendants. 22 Cal. 3d at 278-79 & n.21, 583 P.2d at 763 & n.21, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904
& n.21. The court's decision not to employ statistical decision theory lies in part on its
reliance upon one expert's comment that it is nearly impossible for this method to show that,
when a group member is struck from a petit jury, it is because of membership in the group.
Id at 279, 583 P.2d at 763, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. Seealso Finkelstein, supra note 41, at 352.
73. 22 Cal. 3d at 293, 583 P.2d at 772, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 914 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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based on some legitimate reason, namely one other than group bias.7 4
The requirement that the litigant exercising his right of peremptory
challenge must substantiate its use once prima facie abuse has been
shown modifies, to a limited extent, the statutory definition of a per-
emptory challenge." Henceforth, counsel must remember that the lan-
guage in California Penal Code section 1069, that "no reason need be
given,"' 76 does not mean what it says; rather, a peremptory challenge is
"an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given" if, and only
if, a prima facie case of abuse of this right is not shown, "but upon
which the Court must exclude him."7  Such an addition is necessary
when its absence would deny a defendant his fundamental right to a
fair and impartial jury.7 8
The party to whom the burden of proof shifts may discharge his bur-
den of proof in a manner equally as imprecise as the one used by the
petitioner to establish the prima facie case of discrimination. The court
articulated the "totality of the circumstances test" 79 and further stated
that "we rely on the good judgment of the trial courts to distinguish
bona fide reasons for such peremptories from sham excuses belatedly
contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination."8
Unsatisfactory justification of any questioned peremptory challenge
will result in the dismissal of jurors already selected and the quashing
of the remaining venire;8' satisfactory responses will result in the re-
sumption of the jury selection process.
Relying on the California Constitution, the supreme court found that
the defendant had successfully established a prima facie showing of
prosecutorial use of the peremptory challenge against black jurors
solely on the ground of group bias. Because the trial court incorrectly
ruled that the prosecutor was not required to respond to this allegation,
74. Id at 281, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
75. Id at 281 n.28, 583 P.2d at 765 n.28, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.28.
76. See note 57 supra.
77. Author's interpretation of "new" CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069 (West 1970).
78. Because the right of peremptory challenge is not constitutionally guaranteed but,
rather, is statutorily granted, the peremptory challenge must be modified to ensure that con-
stitutional requirements are satisfied. 22 Cal. 3d at 281 n.28, 583 P.2d at 765 n.28, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 906 n.28. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (constitu-
tional claim must prevail when opposed by a nonconstitutional one).
79. 22 Cal. 3d at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. The court announced that
the "totality of the circumstances test" is relevant if the party charged with abusing the
peremptory challenge can show that minority and majority group members were challenged
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the supreme court reversed the lower court decision. s2
Justice Richardson, in his dissent, reasserted the traditional position
set forth in Swain that "in the appropriate circumstances the race as
well as religion, sex, nationality, occupation, or affiliation of prospec-
tive jurors are trial-related considerations which may constitute proper
reasons for the exercise of the peremptory challenge. '8 3 He suggested
"that what the majority propose[d] as a simple straightforward test will,
in fact, become all too frequently a time consuming inquiry leading the
court, counsel, and litigants into procedural quicksand and a quagmire
of questionable efficacy." 4 Although Justice Richardson stated that
"[tihe majority's rules place the court in a difficult, indeed precarious
position," 5 it is his dissent that advocated preservation of the method-
ology and unworkable burden of proof established in Swain. 6
D. People v. Johnson: Further Clarfcation of the California View
The California Supreme Court applied the rules developed in
Wheeler to People v. Johnson, 7 a case handed down at the same time
as the Wheeler decision. As in Wheeler, the prosecuting attorney in
Johnson used his peremptory challenges against all of the black pro-
spective jurors.8 8 However, unlike the situation in Wheeler, defendant
82. Id at 283, 583 P.2d at 766, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
83. Id at 289, 583 P.2d at 770, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 911 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 293, 583 P.2d at 772, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 913 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
85. Id at 294, 583 P.2d at 773, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 914 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
86. Id at 289-90, 295, 583 P.2d at 770, 773, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 911, 915 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
87. 22 Cal. 3d 296, 583 P.2d 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978).
88. Id at 297, 583 P.2d at 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 915. More recently, in People v. Allen, 23
Cal. 3d 286, 590 P.2d 30, 152 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1979), the California high court applied the
rules established in Wheeler in order to reverse the convictions of two black men accused of
murdering a white man. In Allen, the defendants were able to show: (1) that the district
attorney had used peremptory challenges against each black person on the jury; (2) that the
excused jurors included both men and women who, absent their race, possessed characteris-
tics which the prosecutor probably would have found desirable; (3) that some prospective
black jurors had been excused after only very minimal voir dire; and (4) that the defendants
belonged to a group whose members had been excluded, whereas the victim was a member
of the group to which all the remaining jurors belonged.
These findings enabled the court to conclude that the Wheeler test, discussed in notes 68-
81 supra and accompanying text, had been satisfied and that the defendants had established
a prima facie case of prosecutorial misuse of the peremptory challenge. Because the prose-
cutor did not demonstrate that he had exercised his peremptory challenges on grounds that
were "reasonably relevant to the particular case on trial or its parties or witnesses," 23 Cal.
3d at 294, 590 P.2d at 35, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 459 (quoting Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 282, 583 P.2d
at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906), the court concluded that the defendants' constitutional rights
to a fair trial by jury had been violated.
Although Allen is a case favorable to defendants and stands for the proposition that the
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Johnson was not required to. prove the third element of the test estab-
lished in Wheeler-that there was a strong likelihood that the prosecu-
tion was deliberately removing all blacks from the jury solely because
of their race. This requirement was dispensed with because the prose-
cutor, during voir dire, admitted his intention to use a peremptory chal-
lenge "on any black juror . . . called to sit in this case."89 The
prosecutor volunteered, as an explanation for his intended use of the
peremptories, that some witnesses had made racially prejudicial re-
marks which might be disclosed to the jury, thereby preventing objec-
tivity on the part of any black jurors. Because the prosecutor believed
that "there was no way to voir dire. . . with one hundred percent ac-
curacy [to] identify a black person who could objectively sit on a
jury,"90 he decided to excuse every black juror that he could.
The court felt that the prosecutor should have carried out the voir
dire as thoroughly as possible in order to determine which of the black
veniremen could view the racially offensive testimony in an objective
manner,91 even though such a procedure might result in no black per-
son being retained on the jury. It was not the resulting all white jury to
which the court objected in Johnson; rather it was the methodology
used to achieve this end. The court stated that the use of the peremp-
tory challenge to exclude group members by stereotypical decision
making is a "technique that should be anathema in our courts." 92
V. BEYOND THE CRIMINAL CASE: APPLICATION OF WHEELER To
CIVIL MATTERS
Both Wheeler and Johnson were criminal cases, and the majority in
Wheeler was careful to note that it did not address the question of the
applicability of the Wheeler decision to civil cases.93 It is a common
right to a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community is of paramount
importance, it can best be characterized as a reiteration of Wheeler rather than as an exten-
sion of its holding.
89. 22 Cal. 3d at 298, 583 P.2d at 775, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 916.
90. Id at 299, 583 P.2d at 775, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 916.
91. Id, 583 P.2d at 775, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
92. Id
93. Id at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906-07 n.29. Although not
raised by the facts in Wheeler or Johnson, the California Supreme Court briefly addressed
the interesting question of how it would react if confronted with a case in which defense
counsel peremptorily challenged certain jurors merely because they were members of an
identifiable group. In dictum, the court commented: "[Tihe People no less than individual
defendants are entitled to a trial by an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-
section of the community. Furthermore, to hold to the contrary would frustrate other essen-
tial functions served by the requirement of cross-sectionalism." Id (dictum). This language
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practice for trial attorneys in civil matters to use the peremptory chal-
lenge to excuse prospective jurors because of their race, sex, religion,
occupation, or other personal attributes.94
The court in Wheeler did comment that "[w]hether the [cross section]
requirement also applies in a civil setting turns on such considerations
as the function of a jury in that setting."95 Although cross section
problems heretofore have been encountered most frequently in the set-
ting of a criminal trial,96 article I, section 16 of the California Constitu-
tion,97 which mandates that juries be drawn from a representative cross
section of the community, applies equally to criminal and civil ac-
tions.98
As the right to a jury trial encompasses the right to a fair and impar-
tial jury,9 9 it seems reasonable to suggest that judicial interpretation
implementing this fundamental right be extended to civil matters. The
limitation imposed on the peremptory challenge by the representative
cross section rule, making group bias an unacceptable reason for exer-
cise of the peremptory challenge, is workable within the framework of
a civil case. Although the Wheeler test 00 could be used in civil mat-
ters, it may be difficult for one claiming abuse to satisfy the third crite-
rion-that there is a strong likelihood that those being challenged are
being excused because of their group association. This difficulty might
arise when a party, cognizant of the fact that a unanimous jury is not
required in civil actions,' decides to keep a group member on the jury
in an attempt to avoid being challenged on the ground of violating the
representative cross section rule. When unanimity among jurors is not
required, the relative impact that each juror has on the verdict dimin-
ishes, and room for abuse increases.' 0 2
Courts need to be wary of schemes designed to thwart the goal of a
fair jury in all cases. As the court recognized in Wheeler, trial judges
strongly suggests that, just as the prosecutor is precluded from using peremptory challenges
for "group bias reasons," so too will defense counsel be subject to this limitation.
94. See id at 289, 583 P.2d at 770, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 911 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
95. Id at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906-07 n.29.
96. Id
97. Id See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
98. 22 Cal. 3d at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906-07 n.29.
99. See notes 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 68-81 supra and accompanying text.
101. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 16 reads in relevant part: "Trial by jury is an inviolate right
S. .. but in a civil cause three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict." (emphasis added).
102. See VAN DYKE, supra note 9, at 213. ("In upholding the constitutionality [of the]
. . less-than-unanimous verdicts, the Supreme Court has opened the way for a radical
change in our system ofjustice. .. .The ability ofjuries to reflect minority viewpoints...
will be erased in many cases where unanimity is not required.").
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"6are in a good position to make. . . determinations [whether peremptory
challenges are being misused]. . . on the basis of their knowledge of local
conditions and of local prosecutors." They are also well situated to bring
to bear on this question their powers of observation, their understanding
of trial techniques, and their broad judicial experience.' 
3
The court voiced confidence in the ability of judges to distinguish true
claims of discrimination from those claimed for purposes of harass-
ment or delay." These judicial attributes of discernment and compre-
hension are equally applicable to civil cases.
VI. NEW HOPE FOR FEDERAL DEFENDANTS
Although Swain expresses the United States Supreme Court's view
regarding the exercise of the peremptory challenge, litigants in federal
proceedings0 5 may be able to utilize the ruling of the California
Supreme Court in Wheeler to prove abuse in the exercise of the per-
emptory challenge. They could use the rationale of the California
court's decision to urge, as commentators have, 0 6 that the time has
come for reevaluation of the principles expressed in Swain.
Alternatively, petitioners could argue that Supreme Court cases de-
cided subsequently to Swain applying statistical decision theory to the
data of only one case have implicitly overruled Swain's requirement of
systematic exclusion.'07 Recently, the Supreme Court used statistical
data to show discrimination in employment practices and noted that it
had "repeatedly approved the use of statistical proof. . . to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination injury selection cases."'10 Be-
cause the United States Supreme Court has given increasing weight to
statistical evidence in the recent past,'09 counsel reasonably could con-
103. 22 Cal. 3d at 281, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 (quoting Kuhn, supra note
30, at 295).
104. Id
105. Assuming that the California Supreme Court extends the rule established in Wheeler
to civil matters, litigants in federal civil proceedings might be able to argue that state law
should be applied pursuant to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938) ("Except in
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied
in any case is the law of the State.").
106. See cases cited note 109 infra.
107. See, e.g., Comment, A Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at
Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 662 (1974); Comment, The Prosecu-
tor's Exercise of the Peremptory Challenge To Exclude Nonwhite Jurors: A Valued Common
Law Privilege in Conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 554 (1977);
Peremptory Challenge, supra note 19.
108. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
109. For cases using mathematical probability to reveal racial discrimination in jury se-
lection, see Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
1979]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
tend that such methods are not only adequate to demonstrate abuse in
the exercise of the peremptory challenge but also preferred by the
Court in its desire to be free from the Swain systematic exclusion re-
quirement.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even if the dissent in Wheeler is correct in its assertion that the per-
emptory challenge has undergone a substantial change," 10 counsel re-
tains considerable latitude in its exercise. It is only when a peremptory
challenge is grounded solely on group bias that it belies the statutory
definition that "no reason need be given."
Jurors should be challenged as individuals and excused if counsel
believes that a prospective juror is not impartial. Requiring an attor-
(1972); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967) (per curiam); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24
(1967) (per curiam); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
At least one defendant in federal court has been successful in securing a new trial even
though she was unable to prove systematic exclusion of blacks from trial juries within the
meaning of Swain. In that case, United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D. La.
1974), the defendant alleged that the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1861-1869, had not been complied with in the selection of the jury panel. In support of
this contention, the defendant accumulated detailed statistical information from each case
involving a black defendant for the two years preceding her trial. Although the statistical
data revealed that blacks, as compared to non-blacks, were underrepresented on the lists
from which jury panels were drawn, the court determined that the particular jury panel
delivering the indictment in the McDaniels case did not suffer from underrepresentation of
black persons. This representative quality, however, had been eliminated by the prosecu-
tor's use of his peremptory challenges. He used these challenges to excuse six black persons,
thereby creating a jury composed of eleven white persons and one black individual.
The use of the peremptory challenges in MeDaniels, together with statistical data (show-
ing that nearly one-half of all possible peremptory challenges available, and two-thirds of
those challenges actually used during the two year period examined had been exercised
against black persons), convinced the court to grant a new trial "in the interest of justice"
pursuant to rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although rule 33 is to be
used with great caution, United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1958), it was found
to be the appropriate remedy under the facts of McDaniels and may be helpful for future
defendants.
The Jury Selection and Service Act provides that "[n]o citizen shall be excluded from
service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United States on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976). The Mc-
Daniels court recognized that this Act "deals only with the method of selecting the jury
venire, and is not concerned directly or indirectly with the challenging process." 379 F.
Supp. at 1249. However, this court also acknowledged that "[p]eremptory challenges bar
jurors from service just as effectively as any other method." Id. Perhaps a similar argument
could be made in those states that do not follow rules similar to those expressed in Wheeler.
Resolution of this question will depend on courts' application of the Erie doctrine. See note
105 supra.
110. 22 Cal. 3d at 288-95, 583 P.2d at 769-73, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910-15 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting). See notes 83-85 supra and accompanying text.
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ney who has peremptorily challenged a disproportionate number of
"group members" to come forward with nongroup reasons for the use
of his challenges is a small price to pay to ensure the integrity of the
jury process.
Deborah S. Feinerman

